Resumo: Mente é, para Peirce, um sistema de crenças que age para alcançar um determinado propósito. Não apenas Peirce atribui mente a instituições e grupos sociais, mas o desenvolvimento da mente depende da extensão dela além das mentes humanas individuais. Portanto, comunidades ou instituições sociais incorporam hábitos sociais e agem como mentes, com propósitos próprios, fixando crenças de dois tipos: crenças de importância vital e crenças teóricas, que têm relação com o conhecimento e a verdade. Redes sociais, na internet, podem (...) ser vistas como uma complexa mente social composta por indivíduos e suas mídias digitais, as quais englobam gadgets, algoritmos e plataformas. Se as redes sociais na internet atuam de forma a atingir certas crenças, de que tipo elas são? São crenças de importância vital ou crenças teóricas que conduzem ao conhecimento e à verdade? Esses dois tipos de crenças são suficientes para entender os modos de ação das redes sociais na internet? (shrink)

O artigo elenca os elementos que demarcaram o iluminismo e suas influências na educação a partir do século XVIII. O estudo visa responder: o que foi o século das luzes e quais as suas contribuições para a educação? Como instrumento da coleta de dados priorizou-se o uso de textos em três momentos, a saber: primeiro - dos tipos “resposta à pergunta o que é o Esclarecimento?; segundo - análises sobre o pensamento rousseauniano a partir dos textos “Emílio ou da educação” (...) e “Projeto de Educação” nas abordagens de Rousseau para suscitar debates sobre a educação humanista fundamentada na vivência do Contrato Social e nos fundamentos de uma educação para a sensibilidade do sujeito moderno; terceiro - discutir o legado das ideias iluministas no processo educacional na realidade brasileira. (shrink)

La parentalité impose au sujet un travail psychique intense qui s’appuie sur des aspects narcissiques, archaïques, sur l’histoire de la filiation et de la transmission psychique. La parentalité est, avant tout, liée à un processus qui comporte des risques psychiques particuliers face aux événements de vie. Identifier ces enjeux dans la relation parent-enfant et comprendre ce qui est sollicité pour le sujet face à des événements nécessite de remodeler les alliances et de trouver un nouvel équilibre psychique. Dans le cadre (...) d’une recherche clinique, les auteures, impliquées dans un dispositif d’écoute psychanalytique de la parentalité, proposent une discussion quant aux repères cliniques des enjeux qui sous-tendent la relation parent-enfant. Ce questionnement est discuté par deux vignettes cliniques, celle de Maria qui, après son accouchement, expérimente des vécus corporels primitifs projetés sur son bébé et celle de Camila, qui commence son analyse après la tentative de suicide de sa fille. Dans l’ensemble de ces vignettes, on observe une réorganisation de la dynamique psychique et une possibilité de symboliser davantage les modes d’alliance de la dyade parent-enfant. (shrink)

Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the (...) second, the many are all cats, but they are almost identical to each other, and hence they are almost one. For Lewis, the two solutions do not compete with each other but are mutually complementary, as each one can assist the other. This paper has two aims: to give some reasons against the first of these two solutions, but then to defend the second as a self-standing solution from Lewis’s considerations to the contrary. (shrink)

Th e simple proposal about rigidity for predicates can be stated thus: a predicate is rigid if its canonical nominalization signifi es the same property across the different possible worlds. I have tried elsewhere to defend such a proposal from the trivialization problem, according to which any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be rigid. Benjamin Schnieder (2005) aims fi rst to rebut my argument that some canonical nominalizations can be fl exible, then to provide fi ve arguments to the (...) eff ect that they are all rigid, and fi nally to propose a general explanation of why they are all rigid. I show fi rst why my argument has not been rebutted, then why Schnieder’s fi ve arguments for their rigidity all fail, and fi nally why the alleged “explanation” cannot be such, as the facts alluded to are neutral with respect to the rigidity or fl exibility of the nominalizations. (shrink)

Background: A short version of the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale comprising only re-experiencing symptom items has been recently validated on Japanese adults. This short-version-PDS had good psychometric properties among Japanese adults with and without posttraumatic stress disorder. The aim of this study was to translate and culturally validate the short-version-PDS for the Brazilian sociolinguistic context.Methods: A translation of the short-version-PDS was performed based on established guidelines. We enrolled 53 patients with PTSD as a potential comorbidity. The translation and cross-cultural adaptation of (...) the short-version-PDS included forward and back-translation by a Japanese Brazilian researcher and a certified translator; synthesis was achieved by consensus, backward translation, pilot test, and finalization. Content validity coefficient was used to assess quality of adaptation. Internal consistency was calculated using Cronbach's alpha coefficient. Spearman correlations were between the new short-version-PDS and the Brazilian version of the posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist for DSM-5, and a receiver operating characteristic curve was used to determine the best cut-off values for the short-version-PDS.Results: The short-version-PDS was well accepted by all subjects, none of the questions were experienced as inappropriate, and all questions of the 3 items were judged important. Item 1 presented CVCt = 0.92; item 2 had a CVCt = 0.87 and item 3 had a CVCt = 0.95. The internal consistency of the final version as measured by Cronbach's alpha was 0.78. The short-version-PDS scale correlated positively with the DSM-5 scale with a Spearman rho of 0.64 (95%CI [0.4-0.8], p 31.0 with sensitivity and specificity are 86.4 and 93.5%, respectively.Conclusions: This Brazilian Portuguese version of the short-version-PDS had good psychometric properties among Brazilian adults with and without PTSD. Transferability and generalizability of the cut-off scores should be further analyzed. (shrink)

Kilimanjaro is a paradigmatic mountain, if any is. Consider atom Sparky, which is neither determinately part of Kilimanjaro nor determinately not part of it. Let Kilimanjaro(+) be the body of land constituted, in the way mountains are constituted by their constituent atoms, by the atoms that make up Kilimanjaro together with Sparky, and Kilimanjaro(–) the one constituted by those other than Sparky. On the one hand, there seems to be just one mountain in the vicinity of Kilimanjaro. On the other (...) hand, both Kilimanjaro(+) and Kilimanjaro(–)—and indeed many other similar things—seem to have an equal claim to be a mountain: all of them exhibit the grounds for something being a mountain—like being an elevation of the earth’s surface rising abruptly and to a large height from the surrounding level,1 or whathaveyou—; and there seems to be nothing in the vicinity with a better claim. Hence, the problem of the many. (shrink)

Tesis doctoral presentada en el departament de Lògica Història i Filosofia de la Ciencia de la Universitat de Barcelona per optar al títol de Doctor en Filosofia.

According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith , “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive (...) similarities and differences being relevant in the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence plays an important role and has been used by several countries as a health strategy in an attempt to understand, control and find a cure for the disease caused by Coronavirus. These intelligent systems can assist in accelerating the process of developing antivirals for Coronavirus and in predicting new variants of this virus. For this reason, much research on COVID-19 has been developed with the aim of contributing to new discoveries about the Coronavirus. However, there are some epistemological (...) aspects about the use of AI in this pandemic period of Covid-19 that deserve to be discussed and need reflections. In this scenario, this article presents a reflection on the two epistemological aspects faced by the COVID-19 pandemic: The epistemological aspect resulting from the use of patient data to fill the knowledge base of intelligent systems; the epistemological problem arising from the dependence of health professionals on the results/diagnoses issued by intelligent systems. In addition, we present some epistemological challenges to be implemented in a pandemic period. (shrink)

Reponse to Peter Milne (2005)'s argument agaist maximalism about truthmaking.

In the recent literature on contextualism and relativism, one often finds disputes as to which kind of consideration would be relevant for positing a feature of a context as a parameter in the ‘‘circumstance of evaluation’: via the presence of an operator in the language which shifts that feature (Stanley) or by being a feature of a context with respect to which the truth of ‘‘propositions’’ expressed in the context is relative (McFarlane). This kind of dispute arises from two different (...) independent roles that elements in ‘‘circumstances of evaluation’’ are sometimes assumed to have. I distinguish indices from points of evaluation, and motivate its significance in the debate. (shrink)

What different relativist claims about a given domain are to be distinguished? Which of them is best placed to account for intuitive facts about disagreement in that domain? In a recent paper in this journal, ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ (2004), Max Kölbel distinguishes two forms of relativism, andargues that one of them, indexical relativism, faces problems in accounting for disagreement. In the first part of this discussion I present my own taxonomy of relativist positions in a given domain, which (...) is based on David Lewis’s 1980 essay, and I compare it with Kölbel’s and other recent suggestions. In the second part, I argue that the presuppositional defence of indexical relativism against related objections that I have elaborated elsewhere is also effective against Kölbel’s recent charges. (shrink)

Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...) case of consciousness, in the way it is explained away in the rest of familiar cases of necessary aposteriori statements. In a recent paper, Pérez Otero (2002) argues that there is an alternative way of explaining it a way, in terms of mere aposteriority. I argue against the exegetical accuracy and the truth of this contention. (shrink)

Upon her release, Mary gains new knowledge aligned with B-type materialism and property dualism, even though she already possesses knowledge of all the facts and truths related to color and color vision during her time in captivity. I argue that this “cognitive progress” can only be accounted for by the acquisition of a new nonconceptual representation of the color red upon her release. Independently of any concepts, this acquisition already enables her to discriminate all sorts of shades of color within (...) her environment. However, the existence of nonconceptual representations, by itself, is not enough to specify the type of knowledge Mary acquired, obviously. We must add two additional conditions. Firstly, the acquisition of these nonconceptual representations must enrich Mary’s preexisting physical concept of red. Assuming that concepts are mental files, the enrichment takes the form of housing information in analog format, like pictures of the color red. Secondly, by utilizing these enhanced concepts by analog information, Mary can achieve an introspective propositional knowledge. She learns the truth of the crucial proposition: she learns what it is like to experience red. (shrink)

There are certain metaphysically interesting arguments ‘from vagueness’, for unrestricted mereological composition and for four-dimensionalism, which involve a claim to the effect that idioms for unrestricted quantification are precise. An elaboration of Lewis’ argument for this claim, which assumes the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, is presented. It is argued that the argument also works according to other views on the nature of vagueness, which also require for an expression to be vague that there are different admissible alternatives of (...) the relevant sort, such as epistemicism, as defended by Williamson. Recent attempts to resist the argument are discussed and rejected. (shrink)

According to the simple proposal, a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property across the different possible worlds. The simple proposal has been claimed to suffer from an over-generalization problem. Assume that one can make sense of predicates signifying properties, and assume that trivialization concerns, to the effect that the notion would cover any predicate whatsoever, can be overcome. Still, the proposal would over-generalize, the worry has it, by covering predicates for artifactual, social, or evaluative properties, such as (...) 'is a knife,' 'is a bachelor,' or 'is funny.' In defense, it is argued that rigidity for predicates as characterized plays the appropriate theoretical role, and that the contention that "unnatural" properties are not to be rigidly signified is ungrounded. (shrink)

The paper proposes and defends the following characterization of response dependent property: a property is response-dependent iff there is a response-dependence biconditional for a concept signifying it which holds in virtue of the nature of the property. Finding out whether a property is such is to a large extent a posteriori matter. Finally, colors are response dependent: they are essentially tied to issuing the relevant experiences, so that having those experiences does give access to their, dispositional, nature. Finally, some important (...) contrary views are critically discussed in the paper. (shrink)

The author defends the naturalizing program of the notion of representation against the primitivist view according to which the notion of representation as belonging to psychology as a mature science is irreducible. First, the author concedes that the original teleological project trivializes the concept of representation by applying it to bacteria, protozoa, amoeba, when the best available explanation is the assumption that primitive organisms and artifacts are merely indicating proximal stimulation rather than representing the distal causes of stimulation. Yet, the (...) author does not believe that this presents an unsurmountable obstacle for the naturalizing program when what is in question is genuine sensory representation, namely perception. In the author’s view, what matters for the naturalizing program are not cases in which the concept of representation is misemployed, but rather cases in which the focus is genuine sensory representation, that is, genuine perceptions; or so he shall argue. (shrink)

Critical notica (in Spanish) of *Relativism and Monadic Truth* (OUP 2009), by Cappelen and Hawthorne.

Neste artigo, no intuito de nos inscrevermos em uma reflexão mais abrangente acerca dos negacionismos contemporâneos, com foco no “negacionismo histórico”, que se sustenta por processos de falseamento e homogeneização da história e das memórias, buscamos seguir o seguinte roteiro de reflexão analítica: i) tratar da escrita da história, abordando a produção de memórias, as políticas de esquecimento e o falseamento discursivo da história; ii) traçar um panorama acerca da escrita da história e da produção de memórias da ditadura civil-militar (...) brasileira, observando, de um lado, a produção discursiva nos campos escolar, jornalístico e “de história”, como formas de manifestação e promoção da memória oficial do regime, e, de outro, a construção das políticas institucionais de memória, com foco nas comissões de verdade, como mecanismos de instituição de regimes de dizibilidade sustentados por memórias-outras; iii) como eixo analítico-conclusivo, traçar uma reflexão que vai da negação da história à formação do autoritarismo contemporâneo, tomando como exemplo a violência contra os povos originários. Inscrevemo-nos, para dar cabo a esta discussão, na perspectiva arqueogenealógica dos Estudos Discursivos Foucaultianos, a partir da mobilização de um arcabouço teórico-metodológico que permite a análise dos processos de formação dos enunciados e dos discursos e, fundamentalmente, uma crítica reflexiva do presente. (shrink)

According to relativism, these appearances of faultless disagreement are to be endorsed. According to moderate relativism, this can be done within the general Kaplan-Lewis-Stalnaker two-dimensional framework, in which the basic semantic notion is that of a sentence s being true at a context c at the index i: it may in effect be the case that s is true at c but false at c∗. According to indexical relativism, this is so in virtue of the content of sentence s at (...) c being different from that of s at c∗. (shrink)

O presente artigo procura esclarecer os traços fundamentais da relação entre o pensamento de Heidegger e a política. No contexto da emergência do nazismo na Alemanha, Heidegger recusará a compreensão do povo como “raça” e como “valor supremo”. Nesta linha, apropriando-se da concepção de Ernst Jünger do “trabalhador”, procurará pensar a relação deste trabalhador com um mundo, ou seja, a “mobilização total” do mundo por uma “vontade de poder”, para lá daquilo a que chama a “metafísica da subjectividade”, à qual (...) o próprio Jünger permanecerá amarado. Por outro lado, confrontando-se com o conceito do político de Carl Schmitt, Heidegger procurará aceitar o desafio de pensar este mesmo político como algo irredutível ao estatal. No entanto, se, em Schmitt, a tentativa de pensar o político como algo anterior ao Estado o conduzia a pensá-lo a partir da diferenciação amigo-inimigo, e a defender esta diferenciação como algo que deveria ser monopolizada pelo Estado, Heidegger procurava pensar o político fora da relação amigo-inimigo e, neste sentido, como uma instância que destituiria o Estado de um estatuto de “valor supremo”. (shrink)

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) argues against attempts to preserve the entailment principle (or a restriction of it) while avoiding the explosion of truthmakers for necessities and truthmaker triviality. In doing so, he both defends the disjunction thesis--if something makes true a disjunctive truth, then it makes true one of its disjuncts--, and rejects the conjunction thesis--if something makes tue a conjunctive truth, then it makes true each of its conjuncts. In my discussion, I provide plausible counterexamples to the disjunction thesis, and (...) contend that Rodriguez-Pereyra's general defence of it fails. Then I defend the conjunction thesis from Rodriguez-Pereyra's case against it. (shrink)

A comunicação situa-se na continuação do estudo apresentado ao II Congresso Internacional da AFFEN, intitulado A vida e o humano em Heidegger: a ontologia heideggeriana na aurora de uma biopolítica, e pretende considerar as consequência, na filosofia de Heidegger na transição entre os anos 20 e 30, do seu afastamento em relação ao conceito de vida. Ver-se-á como é este afastamento, determinado pela meditação em tomo do pensamento de Ernst Jünger e pela confrontação com o biologismo nacional-socialista, que conduz àquilo (...) a que se poderia chamar uma transformação interior da abordagem heideggeriana da essência do humano, e da sua determinação como ser-no-mundo. Uma tal transformação acontece em três passos fundamentais: 1. urna “radicalização filosófica” - para usar os terinos de Jean Grondin - do conceito de finitude (1929); 2. um enraizamento da não-verdade na essência da verdade (1930); 3. a transformação do conceito de mundo em pólo da unidade constituída pela relação agónica entre terra e mundo (1935). Através desta transformação, Heidegger confronta-se com a meditação jüngeriana acerca da “mobilização total” do mundo, surgindo assim a sua história do ser como a representação de um processo no qual o ser abandona o ente, a terra é destruída e o mundo é despojado de terra. Numa tal história, marcada, numa perspectiva geral, por aquilo a que Heidegger chama a “fuga dos deuses”, dir-se-ia que tudo no ente fica exposto e que o mundo - sendo aquilo que, no aparecer do ente, não aparece e se encobre enquanto condição do próprio aparecimento - chega ao fim. Heidegger apresenta então o fim do mundo, através do seu pensar de uma história do ser, para o recusar e resistir contra ele. O salto da “história do ser” para um “outro início” da história, aquilo a que Heribert Boeder chama o “pensar apocalíptico” constitutivo da meditação modema heideggeriana, traduz assim um recuo de Heidegger diante do fim do mundo. (shrink)

Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by contrasting attitudes. (...) As such, contextualism is clearly straightforwardly compatible with facts about the existence of disagreement. There is, however, a genuine prima facie worry for contextualism involving facts about the expression of disagreement in ordinary conversations. Elaborating on a suggestion by Lewis :113–138, 1989), I argue that the presupposition of commonality approach in López de Sa shows that there are versions of contextualism that are in good standing vis-à-vis such facts about the expression of disagreement. (shrink)

After presenting a negative characterization of metaphysical vagueness and the main tenets of the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, the paper critically discusses the objection that such a view requires that at least some vagueness not be just constituted by semantic indecision—but rather by the metaphysical vagueness of some semantic relations themselves submitted by Trenton Merricks and, more recently, Nathan Salmon.

O objetivo deste trabalho é rever criticamente algumas interpretações contemporâneas da noção kantiana de intuição sensível. Defendo uma interpretação alternativa segundo a qual a intuição sensível em Kant deva ser entendida nos termos do que McDowell denomina sentido de re cuja principal característica é a dependênciado objeto. Nesse sentido, a função da intuição sensível é introduzir entidades no discurso para que essas possam ser conceituadas em juízos. Por essa razão,as intuições sensíveis devem ser vistas como o modo de se dar (...) dos objetos e seus atributos e relações que a eles se refere apenas na medida em que eles nos aparecem de forma dependente e relativa. (shrink)

In recent years, some people have held that a radical relativist position is defensible in some philosophically interesting cases, including future contingents, predicates of personal taste, evaluative predicates in general, epistemic modals, and knowledge attributions. The position is frequently characterized as denying that utterance-truth is absolute. I argue that this characterization is inappropriate, as it requires a metaphysical substantive contention with which moderate views as such need not be committed. Before this, I also offer a more basic, admittedly less exciting (...) alternative characterization of the position, in terms of departing from the Kaplan–Lewis–Stalnaker two-dimensional framework. (shrink)

A luz da analítica do Dasein, apresentadaem "Ser e Tempo", o trabalho discute apossibilidade de fundamentação da relaçãopsicoterápica a partir da noção de "cuidado". Desta perspectiva, a questão da verdadena clínica desloca-se do âmbito das teorias e dastécnicas psicológicas 'para aquele da existência,em que está sempre em jogo o próprio ser dohomem. Ao mesmo tempo, fornece ao cuidadoterapêutico uma base ontológica que não provémnem da teorização científica nem de uma concepçãohumanista, subjetivista e sentimental.

Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one grants an (...) independent further principle involving biconditionals. I finally argue that the formulation of this is, however, contentious in a similar manner. (shrink)

According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith, “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive similarities (...) and differences being relevant in the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s. (shrink)

In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent (organisms and bodies can vary, as can even the spaces they occupy in the same experience vary), 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- (...) phenomenal externalism of enactivist nature, even in its mild form, is empirically implausible: the correlation between the conscious character of sensory experience with spatiotemporal neuronal patterns is much more systematic and regular than with anything outside the brain. But in its radical form is entirely implausible and contra-intuitive: phenomenal duplicates are not necessarily duplicates of agency; in short, 5-we are our own brain that has a body, avatars, and artifacts, properly configured, and molded by the brain, and not a body that has a brain among other essential organs. (shrink)

In recent discussions on contextualism and relativism, some have suggested that audience-sensitivity motivates a content relativist version of radical relativism, according to which a sentence as said at a context can have different contents with respect to the different perspectives from where it is assessed. The first aim of this note is to illustrate how this is not so. According to Egan himself, the phenomenon motivates at least refinement of the characteristic moderate contention that features of a single context determine (...) the appropriate truth-value of the sentence. The second aim of this note is to explore how this may not be so. (shrink)

Discute-se com possíveis distinções entre pluralismo e pluralidade. Tais conceitos são revisitados em Filosofia, Política, Sociologia e Direito. Procura-se detectar especificidades da ideia de pluralidade e de pluralismo aplicados à ética, à moral e ao Direito, no passado e em nossos dias. Indaga-se a respeito da atualidade ou não de certas obras de É. Durkheim, um dos fundadores da Sociologia, para esclarecer o debate contemporâneo sobre questões referentes à pluralidade e ao pluralismo.

Neste trabalho, pretende-se analisar o que se quer dizer com “falácia naturalista” e saber se há bons argumentos para sustentarmos a existência de uma falácia desse tipo. Começaremos estudando o que Hume falou sobre o assunto; se realmente ele enunciou algo como uma “Lei” contra derivar um “dever-ser” de um “ser”. Depois da obra de Hume, passaremos à de Moore. Na obra de Moore, veremos se ele quer dizer com o termo o mesmo que dizemos atualmente. Analisadas as obras dos (...) dois autores, passaremos, por último, a estudar o que “falácia naturalista” e “derivar um dever-ser de um ser” quer dizer hoje. Concluiremos que não há bons argumentos para aceitarmos que o que esses termos denotam é de fato uma falácia. Abstract:In this work, our aim is to investigate the meaning of the term “naturalistic fallacy”, and if there are good arguments to sustain the existence of a fallacy of this kind. We will begin studying what Hume said about the matter; if he really enunciated something like a “Law” against deriving a “is” from a “ought”. In the next section, we will proceed to the the arguments brought by Moore, to see whether the meaning of term is the same for him and us. Having analyzed the works of the two authors, we will proceed, in the final section, to study what the terms “naturalistic fallacy” and “deriving an ought from an is” means today. Finally, we will conclude that there aren’t good arguments for us to accept that what these terms denote is in fact a fallacy. (shrink)

What are things like the Supreme Court? Gabriel Uzquiano has defended that they are groups, entities which are somehow composed of members (at certain times) but which, unlike sets (or pluralities), allow for fluctuation in membership. The main alternative holds that 'the Supreme Court' refers (at any time) to the set (or plurality) of their members (at the time). Uzquiano motivates his view by posing a metaphysical puzzle for this reductive alternative. I argue that a parallel reasoning would also find (...) a corresponding 'puzzle' in the case of singular terms like 'The Chief Supreme Court Justice'. (shrink)